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I s the education system income-equalizing? The evidence from 
developing countr ies shows that whi le education has expanded 
tremendously in recent decades, income distribution has not become more 
equal. This article seeks to resolve this seeming paradox. A theoretical 
model is constructed for the relationship between education and income 
in which ethnicity plays a key role in the distribution process. The model 
predicts that the education system is not income-equalizing. A broader set 
of predictions are derived from the theoretical model and then compared 
to Peruvian data. Statistical tests produce results that are consistent with 
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Education has expanded tremendously in developing 
countries in recent decades. World Bank data show that 
the net primary school enrolment rate rose from 78% 
to 89% between 1980 and 1997, while the secondary 
school rate went up from 53% to 63% (World Bank, 
2001, table 6, p. 285). Yet, paradoxically, the degree 
of income inequality has not declined (Deininger and 
Squire, 1996, table 5; Li, Squire and Zou, 1998). Why 
is education not an income-equalizing system?
The literature has not provided a satisfactory 
scientific explanation for this paradox; and the most 
popular theoretical models on intergenerational 
mobility (Becker and Tomes, 1979; Durlauf, 1996) 
have not been subjected to statistical testing in a 
developing-country setting. 
In contrast, the empirical literature on the 
relationship between education and income inequality 
in the developing world is vast but lacks theoretical 
underpinnings. In the particular case of  Latin 
America, compared to the situation in more advanced 
countries, three empirical insights can be gleaned: 
(i) the distribution of education, measured in terms of 
years of schooling, is more unequal; (ii) the quality gap 
between schools attended by rich and poor students 
is greater; and (iii) income differentials between 
workers with high and low education levels are much 
wider, which some authors attribute to the relatively 
limited supply of educated workers (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira and Menendez, 2007; Birdsall, De la Torre 
and Menezes, 2008; Blom and Vélez, 2004). 
This article explores the role of class and ethnicity 
in explaining the observed relationships between 
education and income, including the paradox. A 
simple theoretical model is developed for that purpose, 
and its predictions are tested against Peruvian data. 
The role of  ethnicity in the relationship between 
education and incomes in developing countries is not 
widely discussed in the international literature. For 
Peru, Ñopo, Saavedra and Torero (2004) found that 
ethnicity played an important role in the statistical 
breakdown of urban wage differences. For Brazil, 
the study by Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menéndez 
(2007) cited above also found that race affected 
earnings differentials. Neither study has theoretical 
underpinnings, however. 
The article is organized as follows. Section II 
presents a theoretical model in which class and ethnicity 
play a significant role in the education process. Section 
III discusses the role of initial inequality in family 
asset endowments in the process of human capital 
accumulation. The static and dynamic models are 
presented in sections IV and V. In section VI, the 
model’s empirical predictions are tested statistically 
against Peruvian data, utilizing parametric and non-
parametric tests (described in full in the Appendix). 




A simple theoretical model 
Consider a hypothetical capitalist society in which 
the distribution of economic and social assets among 
individuals is highly unequal. Individuals are assumed 
to participate in the economic process endowed not 
only with economic assets but also with social ones, 
thus introducing social factors into the economic 
process. Social assets are special goods, for they belong 
to the realm of rights and entitlements granted to 
individuals in a society. They are not physical goods, 
nor are they marketable.
In this study, social assets will basically refer to 
political and cultural assets. The former are defined 
as the capacity of individuals to exercise individual 
and collective rights, including the right to have rights. 
Unequal individual endowments of political assets 
generate a hierarchy of citizens in society—first-class 
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and second-class. As a result, not all individuals are 
equal before the law; moreover, not all individuals 
have the same degree of access to the public goods 
supplied by the State.1 
Cultural assets are defined as the right of social 
groups to exercise cultural diversity in a multicultural 
and multi-ethnic society. Unequal endowments of 
cultural rights generate ethnic groups with a hierarchy 
of ethnic markers in society: first- and second-class 
races, languages, religions and customs. These markers 
are referred to as cultural because their hierarchies are 
socially constructed and they are transmitted from 
generation to generation. Inequality in cultural assets 
leads to social practices of segregation, exclusion and 
discrimination against certain ethnic groups.
Unequal individual endowments of political and 
cultural assets are assumed to be highly correlated in 
society, so political assets alone can be included in 
the theory. For simplicity, this fictitious society can 
be referred to as the “sigma society”.
The unequal distribution of economic and political 
assets is one of the features of the sigma society. The 
other feature concerns factor endowments, which 
implies the existence of overpopulation. The marginal 
productivity of the whole labour force is too low for 
wage rates to clear labour markets. 
In order to derive empirically refutable predictions 
from sigma theory, a specific sigma society, or a 
particular model of  sigma theory, must now be 
constructed. A set of auxiliary assumptions are then 
introduced.
Race, class and citizenship constitute the social 
structure of sigma society. The total population can 
be divided into: (i) two social classes: capitalists and 
workers; (ii) two types of  citizens: first-class and 
second-class; (iii) three ethnic groups: the Blues, 
the Reds and the Purples, the latter resulting from 
interbreeding between the other two races.2 
1  The concept of citizenship used in this study corresponds to that 
proposed by the sociologist T.H. Marshall in his classic 1950 essay: 
“Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of 
a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to 
the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall 
and Bottomore, 1992, p. 18). 
2  In a paper that analyses theoretical relationships between consumer 
preferences and culture, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) construct an 
abstract world of two ethnic groups, the Greens and Reds, in which 
the Greens are the dominant group. To use primary colours, call 
them Blues and Reds here; then introduce a third ethnic group: the 
Purples, resulting from miscegenation between the two races. As 
in that paper, it is assumed here that people cannot choose their 
ethnic identity, which is exogenous.
Table 1 shows the social structure of sigma in 
matrix form. The Blues constitute the capitalist class, 
owning most physical capital. The Purples and Reds 
belong to the working class. Purples are endowed 
with skilled labour and Reds with unskilled labour 
only. In terms of citizenship endowments, the Blues 
and the Purples are first-class citizens, while the Reds 
are second-class, thus forming the initial inequality 
in individual asset endowments. The social matrix 
shows a society that is highly correlated in terms 
of asset endowment. Three social groups are thus 
identifiable; for easy reference and for reasons that 
will become apparent later on, they will be called by 
the letters A, Y and Z.
Sigma society can now be distinguished analytically 
from a socially homogeneous capitalist society, which 
could be referred to as “epsilon society”. If  epsilon 
society were represented by table 1, there would still 
be two social classes (capitalists and workers) but 
only one citizenship class (C). There would still be 
three ethnic groups, but only one level of citizenship 
for all (C). In epsilon society, therefore, racial 
differences would become unimportant and the social 
matrix would collapse into two social groups only, 
A (capitalists) and Y (workers); social group Z would 
not exist. While sigma society is intended to resemble 
the developing world, epsilon society corresponds to 
the first world. 
The question considered by this paper is whether 
or not the process of human capital accumulation 
through education can reduce inequality in the initial 
distribution of  assets (naturally including human 
capital) and thus make income flows less unequal. 
The answer is developed in the rest of the paper.
TABLE 1










Blues Kb Kh1 C1 A
Purples 0 Kh1 C1 Y
Reds 0 Kh0 C0 Z
Source: prepared by the author.
Symbols: Kb physical capital endowment; Kh1 high-level human 
capital endowment; Kh0 low-level human capital endowment; C1 
first-class citizenship endowment; C0 second-class citizenship 
endowment.
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Human capital is usually defined as the stock 
of  knowledge and productive skills embodied in 
workers. As individuals do not acquire this stock at 
birth, they need to invest in acquiring it through the 
education process. 
The initial conditions that each individual 
brings to the educational system at each level are 
essential for learning. In the literature of  related 
sciences (psychology, biology and neuroscience), the 
standard view is that initial talent endowments matter, 
and talents are multiple —the so-called “multiple 
intelligence theory” (Gardner, 1999).
Brain plasticity theory is another important 
component of the standard view. While the individual’s 
initial talent endowments —his or her genetic 
inheritance— are exogenous (nature), talents become 
endogenous over time because brain development 
also depends on the social environment (nurture) and 
on the interaction between the two. Brain plasticity 
theory is usually stated as follows: “The brain is 
not a computer that simply executes predetermined 
programs. Nor is it a passive gray cabbage, victim 
to the environmental influences that bear upon it. 
Genes and environment interact to continually change 
the brain, from the time we are conceived until the 
moment we die” (Ratey, 2002, p. 17).
On aggregate, individual endowments of talents, 
genetically-based gifts, can be assumed to be normally 
distributed among the population (the result of  a 
random mechanism). The distribution of learning 
skills, in contrast, will be generated by the social 
environment. The important distinction made by 
Rousseau (1755) refers precisely to these two factors. He 
identified two types of inequalities among individuals: 
the natural, determined by randomly assigned natural 
endowments; and the artificial, determined by the 
functioning of society.
The sigma model will assume that nutrition, 
health and language are the main channels through 
which wealthy families can develop higher levels of 
learning skills in their children as compared to poorer 
families. Personal access to nutrition and health, 
as either private or public goods, is assumed to be 
differentiated by social group. 
Language is another factor of  cognitive skill 
inequality associated with a family’s socio-economic 
level. There are language differences between 
individuals, which in sigma society lead to language 
inequality. This inequality is seen in various aspects 
of  language use in the dominant tongue in society, 
such as vocabulary, syntax, ways of  speaking, and 
reading and writing skills. Sociolinguistic theory 
views language inequality as mostly due to personal 
experiences (the social environment) rather than 
genetic factors (Hudson, 1996, p. 204).
Inequalities in language skills between social 
groups imply unequal cognitive skills among their 
children. Abstract and complex thoughts are not 
just language-dependent, but complex language-
dependent. As philosopher John Searle has stated: 
“Some thoughts are of such complexity that it would 
be empirically impossible to think them without being 
in possession of symbols. Mathematical thoughts, 
for example, require a system of symbols... Complex 
abstract thoughts require words and symbols” 
(Searle, 1995, p. 64). The implication seems to be 
that written language allows the individual to work 
with more abstract and complex thoughts than does 
oral language alone.
Consider a situation in which the Y workers live 
in a written culture and most of them are literate, 
but the Z workers live in an oral social environment, 
most of them are illiterate in the dominant language, 
and their aboriginal language is not a written one. 
Assume further that Z workers live in an oral culture 
in segregated communities. In a setting of this type, 
language skills in the dominant language will be very 
unequally distributed through society. 
Due to their illiteracy, Z populations will be 
limited in the use of abstract and complex thoughts. 
To be illiterate in a written culture is different from 
being illiterate in an oral culture. The handicap will 
be greater in the former. Z populations will then 
show lower levels of language skills in the dominant 
language, and thus their children will display lower 
cognitive skill levels than the children of the A and 
Y populations.
III
human capital accumulation: the role 
of initial endowments
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The characteristic of multicultural, multilingual 
and hierarchical society makes sigma a heteroglossic 
society. This term comes from sociolinguistic theory 
and refers to the existence of various forms of, or 
variations in, the use of the dominant language, with 
a hierarchy separating those who are socially superior 
(with a good grasp of the dominant language) from 
those considered inferior. 
The sigma model then assumes that language 
inequality plays a crucial role in generating unequal 
cognitive skills. Sociolinguistic theory goes even further: 
“Linguistic inequality can be seen as a cause of social 
inequality, but also as a consequence of  it, because 
language is one of the most important means by which 
social inequality is perpetuated from generation to 
generation” (Hudson, 1996, p. 205). 
To conclude, in a sigma society with pronounced 
initial inequality in economic and political asset 
endowments, and given the random distribution of talents 
in the population, people will start the human capital 
accumulation process endowed with unequal cognitive or 
learning skills. This initial inequality plays a major role 
in the process of human capital accumulation among 
social groups. It should be noted that this proposition 
is not empirically refutable or falsifiable, because 
learning capacity is unobservable. It will therefore be 
used as a primary assumption of the theory of human 
capital accumulation, presented below.
IV
The transformation of education into income:
a static model 
The static sigma model can be represented by the 
following system of equations:
 kh = f (E, X), f1 > 0, f2 > 0, X = Z, Y, A (1)
 y = g (kh, X, p), g1 > 0, g2 > 0, g3 > 0 (2)
Hence,
 y = g (f (E, X), X, p)
 = G (E, X, p), G1 > 0, G2 > 0, G3 > 0 
(3)
Equation (1) states that the average human capital 
endowment of individuals (kh) depends upon their 
average education level measured as years of schooling 
(E) and the social group to which they belong (Z, Y, 
A). For a given social group, an exogenous increase 
in the average education level will result in a higher 
average human capital level; for a given education 
level, the average human capital level will be higher 
for individuals belonging to the higher-ranked social 
groups (where the hierarchy in ascending order is 
Z, Y, A). 
Equation (2) says that the average income 
of  individuals (y) depends upon their average 
endowments of  human capital and the social group 
to which they belong, for given market conditions 
(p). In a given social group, the higher the average 
human capital endowment, the higher the average 
income will be; for a given endowment of  human 
capital, average income will be higher for individuals 
belonging to higher-ranked social groups (Z, Y, A, 
in ascending order). 
To simplify, assume that market conditions depend 
on the international terms of trade (p), which are the 
sole exogenous variable determining the aggregate 
level of output, employment and mean income in the 
short run. A higher p means a higher relative price 
for exported goods compared to imports, which in 
turn implies higher labour productivity and higher 
demand for labour by domestic firms. Thus, for given 
educational levels, the higher the value of p, the higher 
the average income of the social groups.
Sigma theory assumes that the social structure 
stems from the initial inequality in the distribution 
of economic and political assets. This inequality, the 
variable δ (delta), underlies the X term in equation 
(3). So income differences between social groups 
depend upon differences in their average education 
levels and asset endowments. As long as the values 
of the exogenous variables E and δ remain constant, 
average income in each social group will remain 
constant, and so will the income distribution across 
social groups. 
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Figure 1 depicts the static model. Points m, n 
and r are the average values of years of schooling in 
the three social groups A, Y and Z, and points m’, 
n’ and r’ are the corresponding average incomes. 
The initial inequality in the distribution of  assets 
gives rise to a situation in which the capitalist class 
has the most years of schooling, human capital and 
income, followed by the other two social groups; 
moreover, additional years of schooling in group Z 
will result in a higher income level along curve Z. 
The same process applies to group Y and group A. 
The equilibrium situation is represented by curve L, 
which is empirically observable.
Under the equilibrium situation shown in 
figure 1, three cases can be considered to analyse the 
effect of exogenous changes in education on income 
inequality. Firstly, an additional year of education 
in group Z alone will increase the mean income of 
that group and reduce the initial inequality; but the 
effect will be small. Secondly, an additional year of 
schooling in all social groups will have a small effect 
on inequality; certainly, average income will rise in 
all groups, but it is not clear that relative incomes 
would change substantially. Thirdly, additional years 
of schooling in all three groups, with more years in 
group Z, will have an ambiguous effect or (at best) 
a small one.
In short, the static model predicts that a reduction 
of inequality in years of schooling will not imply a 
significant reduction in income inequality; moreover, 
the same number of schooling years does not generate 
the same average income for all social groups. The 
reason is that the difference in years of schooling is 
only one of the factors generating income differentials 
between social groups. 
The conclusion would be different if  the 
relationship between years of schooling and incomes 
were not separable; that is, if just one curve existed for 
all groups. If  the three curves were reduced to curve 
A in figure 1, an additional year of schooling would 
raise income by the same amount in all three social 
groups. Then, if differences in years of schooling were 
reduced, income inequality would decrease as well; 
moreover, the same number of years of schooling 
would generate the same average income for all social 
groups. But according to the sigma model, this is not 
how the capitalist system operates. Sigma society has 
three separate curves (class and race relationships), 
while epsilon society would only have two separate 
curves (class relationships). 
The relationships presented in figure 1 refer to 
the average values of  the variables for each social 
group. Successful individual cases may occur (people 
jumping from curve Z to Y or even to A), but the 
theory predicts that such cases will be the exception 
rather than the rule. 
Changes in the exogenous variables will change 
the average incomes of social groups in specific ways, 
as indicated by the sign of their effects in equation (3). 
The model’s empirical predictions are thus represented 
in equation (3), which is empirically refutable and can 
be used to test the model’s validity statistically. The 
L curve in figure 1 relates the average values of years 
of schooling and income for each social group. The 
static equilibrium situation shown in figure 1 is thus 
represented by the L curve. 
The sigma model departs from the standard 
analysis in several ways. Standard empirical studies 
usually measure the relationship between education and 
income along line L. Under the sigma model, however, 
the L curve cannot be used to compare the effect of 
exogenous changes in years of schooling on incomes, 
or rates of return on education (as is done incorrectly 
in the international literature), because the effect of 
education on income operates along different paths 
(lines A, Y, Z) for different social groups. Measuring 
the relationship along the L curve would certainly 
overestimate the effect of education on income.
FIGURE 1
hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between education (E), mean income (y)
and ethnic group (A, y, z) 
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Assume now that the quantity of  education is 
determined endogenously in society and in each 
social group in the long run. Assume also the initial 
conditions of  the economic process are given; in 
other words, individual endowments of economic and 
political assets are unequal at the outset, and these 
determine the social structure A, Y and Z. Likewise, 
ignore the short-run effects of the international terms 
of trade in this long-run model.
Dynamic equilibrium will now be defined as a 
sequence of static equilibrium situations over time. 
Therefore, the static equilibrium situation will now 
be considered as the solution of the initial period or 
generation, which is given by the L curve in figure 1. 
This curve shows the initial values of education and 
income for each social group, implying mean education 
and income values for society in the aggregate. 
The dynamic model assumes that part of the total 
output produced in this period or generation will be 
allocated to human capital investment in the form 
of years of  schooling. This investment is financed 
by families and by the State through fiscal policies, 
depending on the social group. As a result, there 
will be more education and human capital for the 
second period, because the average income in society 
increases. For simplicity, the model assumes that the 
growth of  average income depends essentially upon 
the growth of  human capital and hence also on the 
expansion of  education. The other factors usually 
considered as affecting economic growth, such as 
physical capital accumulation and technological 
change, are assumed to be induced by higher levels 
of  education.
Now consider the dynamic process by social 
group. In the next period or generation, education 
levels and average income will be higher in each 
social group (and on aggregate); there will be new 
investment, resulting in even higher education levels 
and average incomes for each social group (and for 
society as a whole) in the subsequent period, and so 
on. This dynamic process can be modelled through 
the L curve in figure 1. Given the initial equilibrium, 
the investment in education will imply an outward 
shift of the curve, say, to L1, which will in turn imply 
a new equilibrium with higher income for each social 
group. Further investment in education will take place 
in this period and the curve will shift outward again, 
to L2 say, and so on. In sum, the L curve will shift 
outward endogenously over time. 
In the process of  accumulating human capital 
through education, each social group will move 
along its specific path, given by lines Z, Y and A 
in figure 1. It was shown above that the process of 
education expansion along their corresponding paths 
does not generate significant reductions in income 
inequality between social groups. Differences in 
years of  schooling can be reduced, but not income 
differences. Given the initial inequality in asset 
endowments, there are two reasons why incomes do 
not converge: (i) in the transformation of  education 
into human capital, more equality in years of 
schooling does not imply more equality in human 
capital, since social groups accumulate human capital 
along different paths; (ii) in the transformation of 
human capital into incomes, the latter depend on 
access to basic markets, which is differentiated by 
social group, and this relationship is not altered by 
human capital accumulation alone. This means that 
education is transformed into income along different 
paths, depending on the social group. The relative 
incomes of  the three social groups over time are 
path-dependent. In other words, the initial conditions 
of  society matter; social history counts.
Initial inequality in economic and political asset 
endowments is thus the key to explaining the non-
equalizing nature of the education system. Differences 
in years of schooling may eventually be eliminated, 
because there is a ceiling to years of education; but 
V
A dynamic model
It should also be noted that this model refers to 
group analysis, in which the aim is to explain differences 
in income and education across social groups. By 
contrast, in the standard literature the empirical 
relationship between income and education is studied 
using Mincerian earnings regressions (Mincer, 1974), 
which refer to individual analysis and thus seek to study 
differences in income and education between individuals 
(including regression variables such as experience, age, 
gender and other individual characteristics).
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this does not significantly reduce income inequality, 
for social groups move along different paths over time. 
Educational mobility is possible, but socio-economic 
mobility is much more problematic. 
In intergenerational terms, the dynamic sigma 
model predicts that the “children” of a given social 
group will tend to inherit the economic status of their 
“parents”. Long ago, the British biologist Francis 
Galton established the “law of regression towards 
the mean” (equalizing tendency) in relation to height 
differences between children and their biological 
parents. The sigma model presented here predicts 
that there will be “no regression towards the mean” 
in incomes between “children” and “parents” in the 
same social group. 
The dynamic sigma model can explain the 
paradox as follows: developing countries are socially 
heterogeneous and hierarchical societies, i.e., they 
resemble sigma society. Inequality in the initial 
distribution of economic and political assets makes 
the society operate with exclusions; in particular, the 
processes of transforming education into human capital 
and this into incomes are differentiated by class and 
ethnicity relationships. In developed countries, the initial 
inequality is such that these processes are differentiated 
by class relations alone; but in the developing world, 
ethnicity also plays a significant role in the reproduction 
of inequality. As long as the initial inequality in asset 
endowments remains unchanged, the education system 
will not be income-equalizing.
VI
Empirical hypotheses tested 
against Peruvian data
A set of empirical predictions about the relationships 
between education and income can be derived from 
the static sigma model. These predictions will then 
be tested against data from Peru, a multi-ethnic and 
multicultural society, to see whether they confirm or 
refute the model. The data set comes from the National 
Household Survey (enaho) of 2003. 
Empirical estimation of  the size of  ethnic 
groups is a complex task. In the case of Peru, the 
Z population corresponds to the descendants of 
indigenous populations. Up to four criteria were 
considered to measure the size of such groups, all 
of which have disadvantages:
— The mother tongue criterion: this criterion 
reduces ethnicity to the language marker, thereby 
underestimating its size. Indigenous people who 
do not speak an aboriginal language —either 
because they belong to a group that does not have 
a legacy of an aboriginal language or belong to a 
generation that has lost the aboriginal language— 
would formally not be counted as indigenous.
— The self-identification criterion: this measure 
understates the size of indigenous populations 
because individuals tend to conceal their ethnicity 
in a hierarchical society. 
— The rural residence criterion: this also underestimates 
the size of the indigenous population because 
people migrating to the cities would not be 
counted as indigenous.
— The rural district birthplace criterion: this criterion 
again understates the size of  the indigenous 
population because children born in a large city 
(following migration) would not be counted as 
indigenous. 
This study chose the last of these to estimate 
the size of the indigenous population, since it seems 
to be the most reliable. Moreover, the analysis will 
refer to the adult population only, aged 25 or over; 
so people born in the rural districts of Peru in the 
three natural regions (the coast, the Andes and the 
Amazon), irrespective of where they currently live, 
are considered mostly indigenous. This represents the 
Z social group of the theoretical model. 
People born in the most affluent residential districts 
of Lima, regardless of where they now reside, are 
considered to belong mostly to the A social group. The 
mestizo or Y group was calculated by the difference 
between the two. The estimates are as follows: social 
group A accounts for 3.5% of the total adult population, 
group Y for 27.5% and group Z for 69%.3
3  The 2001 Household National Survey (enaho) contained 
a question on ethnic self-identification. The result was that 
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h1. hypothesis of quantitative differences in 
years of schooling between social groups
As shown in figure 1, the static sigma model predicts 
that the average number of years of schooling varies 
by social group, increasing in the order Z, Y, A. 
This relationship is shown in table 2. Mean years of 
schooling vary between social groups: 14 years for 
group A, 11 years for group Y and 7 for group Z. The 
medians show the same ranking: 14, 11 and 5 years. 
Parametric and non-parametric statistical tests (see 
Appendix) show that the observed differences in mean 
values are statistically significant. The empirical data 
do not refute the hypothesis, but reveal pronounced 
inequalities in education. 
Using education levels (basic, secondary, technical 
and university) instead of years of  schooling also 
reveals major inequalities. Nearly 70% of  group A 
have attained post-secondary education, compared 
among family heads, 43% declared themselves to be indigenous 
descendants, while 34% claimed to speak an aboriginal language 
(Hall and Patrinos, 2006, tables 2.1, 2.7 and 7.1). These estimates 
of  the proportions of  indigenous people are clearly smaller than 
the 69% calculated in this study, as would be expected from 
the definitions used. Given the order of  magnitude of  these 
estimates, the claim made by many Peruvian writers that the 
predominant ethnic group is Y (“we are a mestizo country”) is 
not empirically supported. 
to 36% of  group Y and just 15% of  group Z; the 
national average is 21%. The exclusion of group Z 
from post-secondary education is remarkable. 
Few studies have been carried out on the 
conversion of  education into human capital, by 
social group. Those that do exist have compared test 
scores, for a given grade, between two categories of 
schools: private-public and urban-rural. The results 
show that the average level of knowledge, measured 
by test scores, is higher among students attending 
private schools than those in public schools, and 
also higher in urban schools than rural ones (Rivera, 
1979; Cueto, Jacoby and Pollit, 1997; Peru, Ministry 
of Education, 2005). 
There is also some evidence of the negative role 
of malnutrition in the learning process at school. A 
study carried out as part of  the Joint Programme 
on Latin American Economic Integration (eciel) 
shows a large and statistically significant negative 
correlation between school performance and degree 
of malnutrition, based on a sample of the student 
population in Lima and in urban and rural Puno 
(Rivera, 1979). 
As social group Z is predominant in rural areas, 
it follows that the transformation of education into 
human capital in Peru seems to operate as shown in 
the structural equation (1). These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis. After 180 years as a republic, 
TABLE 2
Peru: education level by social group, 2003
(Thousands of people and percentages)
Education level
Social group  
Total
Z Y A
Na (percentage) N (percentage) N (percentage) N (percentage)
None 1 283 14.1 110b 3.3 0.7b 0.2 1 394 10.9
Basic 3 903 43 556 16.5 10.1b 2.8 4 470 34.9
Secondary 2 611 28.7 1 475 43.8 94.9 26.9 4 180 32.6
Technical 725b 8 530 15.7 73.4 20.8 1 328 10.4
University 562b 6.2  697 20.7  174.4 49.3  1 433 11.2
Total N 9 083 100 3 368 100 353.4 100 12 805 100
Horizontal percentage 70.9   26.3   2.8   100  
Years of  education
Mean 6.9 10.8 13.7 8.2
Median 5   11   14   9  
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  the 2003 National Household Survey (enaho).
a Population aged 25 or over (sample expansion). 
b Small number of observations, 10% or less of the social group.
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TABLE 3
Peru: mean income by education level and social group, 2003
(Thousands of people, soles per month and percentages)
Education level








(percentage) y N (percentage) y
None 9.6c 171 1.9c 297 – – 604 7.1 180
Basic 41 330 13.1 479 1.0c 137 2 704 32 346
Secondary 32.7 592 44 710 22.7 798 2 998 35.4 637
Technical 9.6c 844 17.2 912 15.8 965 1 001 11.9 876
University 7.1c 1 529  23.8 2 005  60.5 2 721  1 148 13.6 1 943
Total 100 535 100 1 015 100 1 981 8 464 100 717
Total N 5 841 2 330 293 8 464
Horizontal percentage 69   27.5   3.5   100   
Years of  education
Mean 7.6 11.4 14.2 9
Median 8   11   15   11   
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  the 2003 National Household Survey (enaho).
a Population aged 25 or over (sample expansion). 
b Mean income in soles, Lima, October 2003.
c Small number of observations, 10% or less of the social group.
– No population exists in this category.
and despite the expansion of the education system, 
indigenous populations in Peru still suffer a significant 
degree of exclusion from the education system, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.
h2. hypothesis of “separability” and hierarchy  
in the relationship between education  
and income
The static sigma model predicts a positive relationship 
between mean years of education and mean incomes, 
but this relationship is separable and hierarchical 
by social group in ascending order Z, Y, A. This is 
precisely what the reduced form of the model claims, as 
shown in equation (3) and figure 1. Using the reduced-
form equation to test the sigma model therefore has 
epistemological justification; there is no need to test 
it via the structural equations. In other words, if  
equation (3) were false, the assumptions contained 
in equations (1) and (2) could not be true.
Table 3 presents data on incomes by education 
level and social group. In this case, population refers 
to the economically active population (eap) who 
are employed (the small unemployed group is not 
considered). The observed data suggest the existence 
of  a direct relationship between mean income 
and education level both within social groups and 
between them. The question is whether the observed 
relationships are statistically separable for each social 
group and whether they display an A,Y, Z hierarchy 
as the hypothesis proposes. 
Given the existence of quantitative educational 
exclusion, corroborating hypothesis H1, some cells 
in table 3 contain very small numbers. The test must 
then be carried out only between comparable levels of 
education. The members of group Z are concentrated 
in the initial education levels; only a small fraction, 
less than 10%, reach post-secondary levels. In group 
Y, there is a small illiterate population. In group A, 
no one was illiterate or had primary education only. 
The comparable or relevant levels of education and 
social groups are thus the following: at primary level, 
groups Y and Z; at secondary level, all three groups 
A, Y and Z; and at the technical and university levels, 
groups A and Y. The results of the statistical tests 
contained in the Appendix show that the observed 
differences are generally significant. In short, the 
empirical data do not refute hypothesis H2.
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Figure 2 illustrates the nature of the empirical 
relationship found between income and education, 
showing the relevant levels for comparison. The 
gradients of the lines shown suggest a rising trend 
in the three social groups. Moreover, the slope of 
curve A rises faster than that of Y, and that of Y 
more rapidly than that of curve Z. 
The standard regression method could be applied 
to these data to test the relationships between the 
slopes econometrically, using social groups A, Y 
and Z as dummy variables. However, the data reveal 
secondary education as the only relevant level for 
comparison. As is well known, an implicit assumption 
of  the standard regression model is that dummy 
variables must cover the entire range of observations 
of  the independent variables; if  exclusion exists in 
the distribution of  the regressors, as in the case 
shown in figure 2, the standard regression model is 
not applicable. In fact, standard econometric theory 
implicitly assumes the absence of  exclusions in the 
relationships between variables. 
h3. hypothesis of “separability” and hierarchy  
in the relationships between education  
and wages
If wages are substituted for income on the vertical axis, 
figure 1 can also represent the relationships between 
education and wages. A number of  assumptions 
will be introduced here. First, labour productivity 
depends upon the level of workers’ human capital, not 
on their education level. Second, profit-maximizing 
firms operating in competitive labour markets will 
hire workers according to their labour productivity 
and will pay uniform wages for a given level of 
human capital. 
The static labour-market equilibrium situation 
can be written as follows: 
 kh = f (E, X), f1 > 0, f2 > 0 (4)
 w = h (Kh, X, p), h1 > 0, h2 > 0, h3 > 0  (5)
Hence,
 w = h (f (E, X), X, p) = H (E, X, p),
 H1 > 0, H2 > 0, H3 > 0 
(6)
Equation (4) is the old equation (1) showing 
the transformation of education into human capital. 
Equation (5) is also an old friend, now showing the 
transformation of  human capital into wages (w). 
Equation (6) is the reduced-form equation, now 
showing that wages ultimately depend upon education 
and social group, for a given value of p.
Tables 4A and 4B present data on education and 
pay in blue-collar and white-collar labour markets, 
respectively. The mean white-collar salary is twice the 
mean blue-collar wage. The difference in education 
goes in the same direction: mean years of schooling 
is 13.7 years for white-collar workers and 8.5 for 
blue-collar workers, with median values of 14 and 
10 respectively. Education levels appear as a factor 
differentiating the two social groups. The proportion 
of  Z workers engaged in the blue-collar labour 
market is 20%, but the figure for the white-collar 
market is only 14%. Within group Y, the equivalent 
proportions are 21% and 36%, while in group A they 
are 8% and 62%. 
The relevant education levels for comparison 
among blue-collar workers (see table 4A) include 
basic and secondary, while the workers concerned 
are those from the Y and Z groups. In each case, the 
FIGURE 2
Peru: Empirical relationship between 
mean income (y) and education level, 
by ethnic group
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TABLE 4A
Peru: mean wages (blue-collar workers), by education level and social group, 2003
(Thousands of people, soles per month and percentages)
Education level
Social group  
Total
Z Y A
Na (%) mwb N (%) mwb N (%) mwb  N (%) mwb
None 6c 306 1.8c 349 – – 4.7 310
Basic 37.5 489 21.6 518 – – 32.4 490
Secondary 46.7 616 59.4 651 78.2 569 50.8 627
Technical 8.1c 695 13.8 712 21.8 743 10 703
University 1.7c 763 3.4c 796 – –  2.1 778
Total 100 100 100 606 100 579
Total N 1 163 482 23 1 668
Horizontal percentage 69.7  28.9  1.4   100  
Percentage of  total eap (from table 3) 19.9  20.7  7.8   19.7  
Years of  education
Mean 8  9.7  11.3   8.6  
Median 9  11  11   10  
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  the 2003 National Household Survey (enaho).
a Population of blue-collar workers aged 25 or over (sample expansion). 
b Mean wage in soles, Lima, October 2003.
c Small number of observations, 10% or less of the social group.
eap Economically active population.
– No population exists in this category. 
TABLE 4B
Peru: mean salaries (white-collar workers), by education level and social group, 2003





Na (%) msb  N (%) msb  N (%) msb  N (%) msb
None 0.1c 357 0.5c 431 – – 0.3 415
Basic 4.6c 703 1.8c 641 – – 2.8 685
Secondary 29.2 871 28.1 707 14.2 763 27.2 788
Technical 32.9 1 045 26.2 1 009 17.7 1 102 28.4 1 033
University 33.2 1 780  43.4 2 203  68.1 3 182  41.3 2 212
Total 100 1 222 100 1 433 100 2 469 100 1 442
Total N 807 833 181 1 821
Horizontal percentage 44.3   45.7   10   100  
Percentage of  total eap (from table 3) 13.8   35.7   61.8   21.5  
Years of  education
Mean 13.5 13.7 14.9 13.7
Median 14   14   16   14  
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  the 2003 National Household Survey (enaho).
a Population of white-collar workers aged 25 or over (sample expansion). 
b Mean salary in soles, Lima, October 2003.
c Small number of observations, 10% or less of the social group.
eap Economically active population.
– No population exists in this category. 
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observed average wage of Y workers is higher than 
that of  Z workers. The statistical test shows that 
these differences are statistically significant at the 
secondary education level only (which represents 
the largest group in this labour market), as shown 
in the Appendix. The relevant education levels for 
comparison among white-collar workers (see table 4B) 
include the secondary, technical and university levels 
and the Z, Y and A social groups. The statistical test 
shows that the differences are statistically significant 
in five of the nine cases, and at the university level 
the difference is consistently significant, as shown in 
the Appendix. 
Overall, the empirical evidence presented here 
shows that wages and salaries depend positively on 
workers’ education level. As white-collar workers tend 
to have more education than blue-collar workers, the 
mean salary of the former is higher than the mean 
wage of the latter. Lastly, for a given and relevant level 
of education, pay in general depends on the social 
group hierarchy, given by the order A, Y, Z. The same 
relationship is observed in the case of white-collar 
salaries. In brief, the empirical data presented do not 
refute hypothesis H3.
h4. hypothesis of the gap necessarily existing 
between wage and own-account income 
How is labour discipline secured at the firm level 
in a sigma society? As stated in section II, sigma 
theory assumes that firms face conflict in their labour 
relations, so employers must find ways to extract 
effort from workers. Accordingly, they will seek to 
pay a market wage rate above the opportunity cost 
to the workers hired, so workers found shirking 
will be fired and will then suffer an economic cost, 
represented by this wage premium. The opportunity 
cost for hired workers will be equal to the income they 
can make in own-account (self-employed) activities. 
This differential is the labour discipline device used 
by capitalist enterprises to secure the highest level 
of  labour productivity in overpopulated societies. 
For a given level of human capital, the sigma model 
thus predicts a gap between the price paid for labour 
services in the labour market (wages or salaries) and 
own-account incomes. 
Suppose the equilibrium situation implies a 30% 
gap between wages and own-account income. As the 
average wage of social group Y is higher than the 
average wage of social group Z (shown in H3 above), 
the own-account incomes of these social groups must 
follow the same ranking. The efficiency gap applies to 
each social group separately. This hypothesis differs 
from the standard Lewis model (Lewis, 1954), which 
ignores the ethnicity factor so that the efficiency gap 
is uniform for all workers. 
Table 5 presents data on the mean incomes of 
wage earners, salary earners and own-account workers, 
separated by social group. In social group Z, aggregate 
own-account income is lower than salaries and wages. 
TABLE 5





None Basic Secondary Technical University
Group Z
Salary 357a 703a 871a 1 045a 1 780a 1 222
Wage 306a 483 618 695a 763a 557
Own-account income 136 260 451 568a 818a  327
Group Y
Salary 431a 641a 707 1 009 2 203 1 433
Wage 349a 518a 651 712a 796a 630
Own-account income 221a 384a 550 696 1 180  621
Group A
Salary – – 763 1 102 3 182 2 469
Wage – – 568a 743a – 608
Own-account income – 137a 1 032 508a 1 135  1 013
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  the 2003 National Household Survey (enaho).
a Small number of observations, 10% or less of the social group.
– No population exists in this category.
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This relationship also holds true for the relevant 
education levels. Table 5 shows similar relationships 
for social group Y, but in group A the relationships 
seem less clear than in the other social groups. At 
the relevant education level, which is university, the 
relationship is fairly clear, however. The observed 
differences are all statistically significant, as shown 
in the Appendix, so the empirical data do not refute 
the model.
Figure 3 summarizes the results. In group Z, 
the average wage is higher than average own-account 
income at both the basic and secondary education 
levels, which are the relevant comparison categories. 
In group Y, the average salary is higher than average 
own-account income at the three relevant education 
levels: secondary, technical and university. 
To summarize, Peru’s labour markets seem to 
operate as predicted by the sigma model, so that the 
self-employed are mostly underemployed and hence 
form part of the excess labour supply: they would 
prefer employment in the labour market at current 
wage or salary rates. 
Table 6 shows data on excess labour supply 
(unemployment and underemployment) by social 
FIGURE 3
Peru: empirical relationship between wages 
or salaries and own-account income,  
by ethnic group





None Basic Secondary Technical
Education level











Peru: rate of excess labour supply 
(unemployment and underemployment),  






None 88.1 73.7a – 87.1
(11.7)b (12.3) (11.7)
Basic 79.7 61.8 100.0a 77.7
(6.5) (7.2) 0.0 (6.6)
Secondary 57.6 49.8 39.3 54.4
(5.4) (8.2) (11.4) (6.5)
Technical 35.0a 31.1 25.7 32.9
(5.6) (7.3) (12.4) (6.6)
University 29.3a 32.7 28.8 31.0
(7.0) (8.7) (2.7) (7.2)
Total 65.6 44.5 31.5 58.4
(6.6) (8.1) (6.4) (7.0)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the 2003 National 
Household Survey (enaho).
a Small number of  observations, 10% or less of  the social 
group.
b Unemployment rate in parenthesis; underemployment is 
therefore the difference between the total rate of excess labour 
supply (shown in the table) and the unemployment rate (in 
parenthesis).
– No population exists in this category.
group. In terms of differences between social groups, 
the results indicate very high rates of excess labour 
supply: 66% in social group Z, 45% in social group 
Y and 32% in social group A. The Appendix shows 
that the observed differences in the rate of  excess 
supply by education level and social group, in the 
relevant categories, are statistically significant. As 
unemployment rates do not differ greatly, this difference 
mainly reflects rates of underemployment. 
h5. hypothesis of high education mobility but 
low income mobility 
The dynamic sigma model predicts that mean years of 
education tend to equalize between social groups over 
time, but mean incomes do not. This prediction can 
be tested statistically using age brackets as indicators 
of intergenerational differences.
Tables 7A and 7B present ratios of education 
and incomes for intergenerational groups of workers 
and social groups, respectively. Table 7A shows a large 
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TABLE 7A
Peru: mean years of schooling by age bracket and social group, 2003
Social group
 Age bracket (years)  
Total
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-65
 
Na Eb  N E  N E  N E  N E
Z 1 551 11 1 636 8 1 260 7 850 5 5 297 8
Y 912 12 670 12 449 11 218 9 2 249 12
A 146 14 111 14 29 14 6 12 291 14
Total 2 609 12 2 417 10 1 738 8 1 074 6 7 837 9
Ratio Z/A 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6
Ratio Y/A  0.9   0.8   0.8   0.7   1.2  
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  the 2003 National Household Survey (enaho).
a Employed economically active population (thousands of people).
b Mean years of schooling.
TABLE 7B
Peru: mean income by age bracket and social group, 2003
Social group
 Age bracket (years)  
Total
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-65
 Na yb  N y  N y  N y  N y
Z 1 551 530 1 636 596 1 260 623 850 473 5 297 563
Y 912 771 670 987 449 1 195 218 1 626 2 249 1 003
A 146 1 456 111 2 455 29 2 982 6 1 648 291 1 991
Total 2 609 666 2 417 790 1 738 810 1 074 713 7 837 743
Ratio Z/A 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Ratio Y/A  0.5   0.4   0.4   1.0   0.5  
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  the 2003 National Household Survey (enaho).
a Employed economically active population (thousands of people).
b Mean income (soles per month).
increase in years of schooling between generations 
in social group Z: the “children” (in the social, not 
the biological sense) have twice as many years of 
schooling as the “parents”, although the increase 
generated in other social groups is smaller. In social 
group A, education appears to come up against a 
ceiling at around 14 years. As a result, the educational 
gaps between group Z and the other groups have 
narrowed considerably.
The estimated changes in income gaps across 
generations are shown in table 7B. The mean income 
of social group Z in relation to social group A has not 
changed much: the relative income of the “parents” is 
30% and that of the “children” is 40%, which is small 
compared to the changes in educational attainment 
shown in table 7A. The situation of  social group 
Y relative to group A shows a similar pattern. The 
relative income of the “parents” and “children” is 
almost constant at around 40% and 50%, except for 
the eldest group, in which the figure is 100%. The 
latter result is certainly a paradox, possibly due to 
the small size of this group. 
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The conclusion regarding the convergence trends 
between social groups of different generations is that, 
while there is a tendency for differences in years of 
schooling to narrow, there is no similar trend towards 
lower income inequality. This empirical result is 
consistent with the hypothesis.
Regarding the degree of  income inequality 
in Peru, the Gini coefficient estimated from the 
enaho 2003 dataset is 0.59, which is close to other 
estimates made in the past (0.60), based on national 
accounts. This figure must underestimate the true Gini 
coefficient because the incomes of  Peru’s economic 
élite are not included in the sample. It is well known 
that economic élites are absent or underrepresented 
in household sample surveys. Strictly speaking, 
the empirical social group A mostly consists of 
the middle class (executives, administrators and 
top professionals) and does not correspond to the 
capitalist class of  the model. Theoretically, in the 
dual social structure of  capitalists and workers, 
the middle class is usually included in the capitalist 
category (Wright, 1997). This is also the criterion 
followed in this study. 
Peru still displays a relatively high degree of 
inequality and remains one of  the most unequal 
countries in the world. As the sigma model predicts, 
education does not seem to be an income-equalizing 
system. Even if  people have the same number of 
schooling years, average incomes will still depend on 
the social group to which they belong.
VII
Conclusions
The sigma model constructed in this paper predicts 
a set of  empirically falsifiable hypotheses for the 
relationships between education and income. When 
compared against the Peruvian data, the statistical 
tests show that the hypotheses are not rejected. The 
sigma model also predicts the paradox observed in 
developing countries, in which a significant increase 
in the number of years of education has not been 
accompanied by less income inequality. 
The conclusion that education is not an income-
equalizing system is explained by two factors: the 
initial inequality in the distribution of economic and 
political assets between social groups (high degree 
of  inequality) and society’s factor endowments 
(overpopulation). Initial inequality and overpopulation 
are the ultimate factors explaining the paradox; in 
other words, they are the exogenous variables of 
the sigma model. Thus, as long as these exogenous 
variables remain unchanged, the education system 
will remain non-equalizing. 
(Original: English)
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Statistical testing relates to the differences in 
mean years of  schooling between social groups. 
The first test uses F-statistics and the second the 
(non-parametric) Mann-Whitney U-test. The results 
show that the observed mean differences are 
statistically significant. 
APPENDIX
Summary of statistical tests
Hypothesis 1: Differences in mean years of schooling
Social groups
Variance equality test Difference of  means test
T-statistics p value Difference Confidence interval F p value
Z - Y 354.56 0.00 -3.96 [-4.10 -3.81] 2 024.4 0
Z - A 150.21 0.00 -6.87 [-7.20 -6.55] 1 620.48 0
Y - A 53.21 0.00 -2.92 [-3.26 -2.58] 258.3 0
Mann-Whitney U-test
Social groups
Sum of  ranks
Z-statistics p value
Z Y
Z – Y 490 300 000 218 000 000 -61.49 0.00
Z – A 420 400 000 10 058 291 -24.62 0.00
Y – A 38 984 586 2 479 585 -12.57 0.00
Source: prepared by the author.





Variance equality test Difference of  means test
T-statistics p value Difference Confidence interval F-statistics p value
Basic Z - Y 4.24 0.04 -126.41 [-164.86 -87.97] 33.04 0.00
Secondary Z - Y 0.63 0.43 -102.02 [-162.35 -41.68] 6.35 0.01
Z - A 0.15 0.70 -217.56 [-513.60 78.47] 2.11 0.15
Y - A 0.07 0.80 -115.54 [-416.41 185.32] 0.35 0.55
Technical Y - A 0.96 0.33 -41.85 [-307.86 224.17] 0.15 0.69
University Y - A 21.48 0.00 -938.12 [-1677.40 -198.83] 3.30 0.07
Level of  education Social groups
Mann-Whitney U-test 
Sum of  ranks
Z-statistics p value
Z Y
Basic Z - Y 34 224 589 4 808 441 -9.83 0.00
Secondary Z - Y 23 098 507 10 714 470 -7.61 0.00
Z - A 17 017 958 289 828 -2.76 0.01
Y - A 3 033 103 113 184 -1.20 0.23
Technical Y - A 553 451 31 370 -0.72 0.47
University Y - A 785 177 103 934 -0.66 0.00
Source: prepared by the author.
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 Variance equality test  Difference of  means test
 T-statistics p value  Difference Confidence interval F-statistics p value
Secondary Z - Y 8.73 0.00 164.01 [93.99 234.03] 21.08 0.00
Z - A 1.71 0.19 107.76 [-143.00 358.52] 0.71 0.40
Y - A 0.39 0.53 -56.25 [-307.71 195.21] 0.19 0.66
Technical Z - Y 4.75 0.03 35.85 [-67.13 138.83] 0.47 0.50
Z - A 0.70 0.40 -56.94 [-378.31 264.43] 0.12 0.73
Y - A 0.00 0.97 -92.79 [-421. 73 236.15] 0.31 0.58
University Z - Y 21.64 0.00 -422.79 [-1 011.39 165.82] 1.98 0.16
Z - A 60.13 0.00 -1 402.16 [-2 212.04 -592.28] 11.52 0.00
Y - A  16.44 0.00  -979.37 [-1 822.26 -136.48] 5.19 0.02
Level of  education Social groups
Mann-Whitney U-test 
Sum of  ranks
Z-statistics p value
Z Y
Secondary Z - Y 476 879 271 598 4.27 0.00
Z - A 284 144 8 852 1.63 0.10
Y - A 125 362 6 994 0.28 0.78
Technical Z - Y 667 938 391 302 3.39 0.00
Z - A 405 470 13 601 1.30 0.19
Y - A 175 132 10 004 0.35 0.73
University Z - Y 646 406 660 130 -1.85 0.06
Z - A 363 848 56 139 -5.15 0.00
Y - A 344 454 52 041 -4.10 0.00
Source: prepared by the author.
Given the relative size of  the social groups 
(shown in the first hypothesis on exclusion), the 
relevant comparison is between groups Z-Y-A at the 
secondary, technical and university levels of education. 
The contrast for the university level can be made by 
parametric and non-parametric testing. Owing to the 
failure in the variance equality test, the other two can 
be done using non-parametric testing alone. The results 
show that the observed differences at the university 
level are consistently statistically significant; in general, 
the observed values are statistically significant in five 
of the nine cases. 
The test now relates to mean income differences 
between social groups. The parametric and non-
parametric tests show that the observed differences 
are statistically significant at the basic and university 
levels of education. For the other levels of education, 
the parametric test does not pass the test of variance 
equality; hence, parametric tests are the relevant 
ones. These show that differences are not statistically 
significant at the technical level, whereas at the 
secondary level the differences are significant in 
all groups except Y-A. In four out of six cases, the 
hypothesis is not refuted by the facts. 
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Variance equality test Difference of  means test 
T-statistics p value Difference Confidence interval F-statistics p value
Basic Z - Y 0.38 0.54 -35.08 [-115.23 45.07] 0.74 0.39
Secondary Z - Y 4.01 0.05 -34.34 [-91.07 22.40] 1.41 0.24
Level of  education Social groups
Mann-Whitney U-test















Source: prepared by the author.
The relevant comparison is between groups Z-Y 
at the basic and secondary levels of education. The 
parametric test cannot be used because the variance 
equality test fails. The non-parametric test shows that 
the observed differences are statistically significant 
for the secondary education level (the vast majority 
in the group), but not for the basic level. 
Hypothesis 4: Mean differences between wage and salary incomes and own-account incomes
Social group Z
Level of  education
Variance equality test  Difference of  means test
T-statistics p value  Difference Confidence interval F-statistics p value
Basic 72.56 0.00 443.13 [287.90 598.36] 31.31 0.00
Secondary 24.64 0.00 420.17 [365.23 475.12] 224.64 0.00
Total 495.77 0.00  894.33 [757.69 1,030. 97] 164.58 0.00
Level of  education
Mann-Whitney U-test
Sum of  ranks
Z-statistics p value
Own-account Employed
Basic 16 417 007 603 688 -11.93 0.00
Secondary 4 943 900 2 010 686 -24.30 0.00
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Social group Y
Level of  education Variance equality test  Difference of  means test
T-statistics p value  Difference Confidence interval F-statistics p value
Secondary 0.42 0.52 157.72 [80.83 234.61] 16.17 0.00
Technical 0.21 0.65 313.21 [70.70 555.73] 6.41 0.01
University 20.77 0.00 1 022.85 [502.82 1 542.88] 14.86 0.00
Total 140.96 0.00  812.48 [586.29 1 038.68] 49.57 0.00
Level of  education
Mann-Whitney U-test
Sum of  ranks
Z-statistics p value
Own-account Employed
Secondary 772 113 492 733 -12.58 0.00
Technical 64 839 285 864 -13.97 0.00
University 84 954 479 825 -12.06 0.00
In the case of Z workers, the relevant comparisons 
include the one between the basic and secondary 
levels of education. Both the parametric and the non-
parametric tests show that the observed differences 
are statistically significant. In the case of Y workers, 
the relevant comparisons include the secondary, 
technical and university levels of education. The non-
parametric test shows that the observed differences 
are statistically significant in all cases. The parametric 
test is applicable to the university level only, where it 
also shows that the difference is significant. 
Hypothesis 5: Mean differences in labour market exclusion rates
Level of  education Social groups Chi-squared p value
Basic Z - Y 6 855 0.00
Secondary Z - Y - A 4 855 0.00
Technical Z - Y 1 034 0.00
University Z - Y 819 0.00
Source: prepared by the author.
The chi-squared test is used to test differences 
in proportions of exclusion from the labour market 
between social groups. The results show that the 
observed differences are statistically significant for 
all levels of education and the relevant social groups 
at each education level.
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